Elections Are Over, Now Comes the Hard Part
By Op-ed Contributor
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Nov 30 2011
Michael J. Koplow
The seat of Tunisia's Constituent Assembly
By nearly any measure, Tunisia's elections for its Constituent Assembly were a resounding success. Tunisians turned out in large numbers at the polls, and the voting was free of violence, intimidation, and irregularities. The aftermath of the Arab Spring's first free and fair elections demonstrated politics at its best, with Ennahda, CPR, and Ettakatol “ parties spanning much of the political and ideological spectrum “ setting aside their differences to form a broad-based coalition. When looking at the dysfunction currently taking place in the political arenas of established democracies in Europe and the United States, Tunisia's post-authoritarian phase appears to be off to a hugely encouraging start.
Yet while elections are an important step on the path toward democracy, they are oftentimes mistaken as being the most salient feature, or even the only component, of democratic rule. In fact, elections are oftentimes the easiest part of a transition to democracy, and in many cases do not actually serve as a harbinger for democracy at all. Despite regular presidential and parliamentary elections in many sub-Saharan African and former Soviet countries, large numbers of these states remain undemocratic or are hollow democracies at best. A democratically elected government does not always become a democratic regime, and the hard work of creating a democracy in many ways begins after the initial election.
One problem that plagues many states, and which can be seen at this very moment in Egypt, is the reluctance of an entrenched military to hand over genuine power to a civilian government. Luckily for Tunisia, so far this has not presented itself as an obstacle, as the military has largely taken a hands off approach and has shown few indications of wanting to interfere in Tunisian politics. There are, however, two issues looming large that have the potential to muddy any efforts to establish a genuine institutionalized democracy in Tunisia.
Democracy emerges from a stalemate in which no side is able to completely gain the upper hand. In such a situation, democracy is seen by all parties as the second best solution since the best solution “ taking power unopposed “ is unavailable, and so taking a chance by appealing to voters becomes an increasingly viable option. For this reason, new democracies require a degree of uncertainty to maintain themselves; a limited degree of uncertainty about who will win an election allows for the possibility of an eventual change in power without anarchy ensuing since everyone abides by the rules of the game if they know that they might win the next time around. This notion of uncertainty is crucial for democracy to thrive and take root until democratic habits become routine over time.
Tunisia's elections demonstrate this principle perfectly. It was clear going into the election that no party would be able to win an outright majority, and thus the required stalemate conditions were present. It is also evident that public opinion in Tunisia is fluid enough that there will be healthy political competition for the foreseeable future, but this uncertainty over which party will be dominant must be protected at all costs. Nascent democracies that lose this element quickly turn into non-democratic states dominated by a single powerful party, and the Constituent Assembly must make sure that the electoral rules enshrined in the new constitution make it impossible for any one party to amass a permanent majority.
The other pitfall that Tunisia must avoid is the trap of ideological conflict. Ideas are the most potent political force that exists, and while ideology is an effective way for parties to organize and come up with coherent platforms, the elevation of ideology to a first order principle above everything else will spell disaster for democratic politics. When the promotion of an idea becomes so important that it crowds out other priorities and affects the manner in which the state makes decisions, democratic elections become too risky for the state to undertake as the official state ideology might be endangered if the ruling party loses power. This dynamic has plagued states like Turkey and Iran for decades, and given the strong feelings of both Tunisian Islamists and secularists, the danger exists for Tunisia as well. That Islamists and liberals were able to form Tunisia's first democratic coalition is a good sign that ideology so far is taking a back seat to other issues, but this is a factor that bears close watching in the months ahead.
Democracy brings with it a host of benefits, but it is not a magic panacea. It will not cure a country's societal, cultural, or economic problems, and democracy is not necessarily more efficient, orderly, or stable than other forms of government. Tunisian democracy will be challenged by economic hardship and societal demands, and maintaining a stable democratic order will prove to be far more difficult than getting rid of Ben Ali. If Tunisia can manage to keep any one party from becoming too dominant and relegate ideology to the back burner, then it has a great chance to overcome the myriad challenges of establishing true democratic governance and ensuring that the legacy of the Jasmine Revolution is more than just a democratic election.
Michael J. Koplow is a doctoral candidate in Government at Georgetown University, where he focuses on Middle East politics and democratization. His work has appeared in Foreign Policy, Security Studies, the Atlantic, and the New York Times.
